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COMMENTS
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT
AND THE ACCOUNTANT
An increasingly large number of taxpayers-guilty and innocent-
have been faced with tax investigations as the Government seeks to
enforce the civil and/or criminal sanctions of the Internal Revenue
Code. Tax practioners representing such taxpayers have been con-
fronted with a conflict between the demands of the Internal Revenue
Service and his clients' interests. In addition, the extensive use of
the administrative subpoena, the most powerful weapon in the Inter-
nal Revenue Service's arsenal, augmented by the timidity and genu-
flections of taxpayers and tax practitioners, and complimented by
the broad construction given this weapon by the courts, have estab-
lished precedents thought of by many as "the law".
This article will briefly acquaint the reader with the procedural
steps taken by the Internal Revenue Service to enforce compliance
with its request for information, before discussing several contro-
versial aspects of the accountant's involvement in federal tax investi-
gations. Of necessity, the mythical "required-records doctrine" will
be disposed of, for if an individual himself is required to produce
incriminating personal records, there would be little use in present-
ing the problems of testimonial privileges.
PROCEDURE
Under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code,' the Secretary of
the Treasury or his delegate is authorized to investigate income tax
liability. Generally, authority is granted to examine relevant or mate-
rial books and records; to summon the taxpayer or other persons to
produce records; and to take testimony under oath. Although the
persons who may be summoned under this section appear limited, a
closer examination reveals an unlimited choice, including persons
liable for the tax; any officer or employee of such persons; any per-
son having possession, custody or care of books of account contain-
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7602.
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ing entries relating to the business of the person liable for the tax;
and, last but not least, any other person who may be deemed proper
by the agent issuing the summons.2 Various subordinate officers
and employees of the Internal Revenue Service, including revenue
agents and special agents, have received delegated authority to per-
form these functions 3.
The summons may be used to compel testimony and/or the pro-
duction of books, papers, records or other data, only if relevant or
material, and only if for any of the following five purposes:
1. Ascertaining the correctness of any return;
2. Making a return where none has been made;
3. Determining the liability of any person for any internal reve-
nue tax;
4. Determining the liability at law or in equity of any transferee
or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue
tax;
5. Collecting any internal revenue tax liability.
Summonses issued for purposes other than those enumerated in sec-
tion 7602, such as to aid the government in obtaining pre-trial infor-
mation from a third person for use in a pending criminal trial of a
taxpayer, 4 can be stayed, enjoined or quashed.
Investigations generally begin with oral requests that the tax-
payer or third person make available various documents, records and
data. Upon refusal to obey this oral request, a summons may be
issued. 5 Although section 7602 (1) authorizes examination of books
and records, the possessor of those books and records is not liable to
any sanction on refusal to allow examination in the absence of a
summons.
2. Tillotson v. Boughner, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9143 (N.D.Ill.1963).
3. Commissioner Delegation Order No. 4, 1957-1 CUM. BULL. 718; Treas.
Reg. § 301.7602-1(c).
4. In re Myers, 202 F.Supp. 212, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1303 (E.D.Pa. 1962)
"we believe the government's purpose . . . is contrary to our fundamental and
deepseated conceptions of fair play. . . . (The government) . . . should not
oppress a defendant . . . or his prospective witness by invoking in aid of a
criminal charge the processes which Congress has authorized for the administra-
tion of the revenue laws".
5. Supra note 1; Paragraph 678 of the Internal Revenue Agent Manual of
Instruction, Investigations and Procedure, instructs agents not to issue a sum-
mons to an individual taxpayer who is under investigation for possible criminal
violations.
[Vol. 2 : p. 261
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The summons form consists of two pages; the first sheet, marked
"ORIGINAL" (Form 2039), has a certificate of service on the reverse
side; the second sheet, designated "ATTESTED COPY" (Form 2039A),
has pertinent sections of the statute on the reverse side. The face of
the "ATTESTED COPY" (an exact copy of the "ORIGINAL") bears the
the signature and title of the issuer, names the individual whose tax
liability is involved, designates the period or periods under examina-
tion, names the individual before whom the person summoned should
appear, and sets an exact time and place for appearance.
Section 7605 (a) 6 provides that the date and time fixed for appear-
ance in response to a summons shall be reasonable under the circum-
stances and shall not be less than 10 calendar days from the date of
the summons. Although a person summoned may indicate a willing-
ness to comply with the requirements of the summons on a date earl-
ier than required by this section, the time for appearance will, never-
theless, be designated on the summons as not less than 10 days from
the date of the summons. This 10 day delay was apparently designed
to permit adequate consideration of the advisability of contesting the
summons. Although the statute literally states that the 10 day period
conmmences on the "date of the summons", this provision would pre-
sumably be interpreted to mean the date of the service of the sum-
mons. Otherwise, a delay in serving the summons could eliminate
the intent of this 10 day benefit. Although this subsection places no
specific limitation on the distance that a person may be required to
travel in complying with the mandate of the summons, appearance at
the nearest Internal Revenue Office is customary and is "reasonable
under the circumstances".
Any officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service may be
designated as the individual before whom a person shall appear in
response to a summons, and any such person so designated in the
summons may take testimony under oath and may receive books and
records produced in response to the summons. Thus, the person issu-
ing the summons may designate any other officer or employee of the
Internal Revenue Service as the individual before whom the person
summoned shall appear.7
The formal requirements for service of the summons appear in
section 76038 and provide only two methods of service. Service can
be made by delivery in hand of an attested copy (Form 2039A) to
the person to whom it is directed or the attested copy can be left at
the last and usual place of abode of the person to whom it is directed.
6. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(a).
7. Treas. Reg. § 301.7602-1(b).
8. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7603.
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Although section 7603 does not technically require the summons to be
left with a person present at the last and usual place of abode, the
Certificate of Service of Summons which appears on the reverse side
of the "ORIGINAL" summons (Form 2039) specifically requests the
name of the person with whom the summons was left.9 The certifi-
cate of service signed by the person serving the summons is evidence
of the facts it states at an enforcement hearing. 10 Unlike judicial
subpoenas served under Rule 45 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 1 1 which are generally effective only within the district
wherein it originated, Internal Revenue summonses apparently have
no geographic limitations. Even the physical location of documents
requested to be produced in a summons duces tecum is unimportant,
provided they are subject to the control of the individual served.12
Neglect or refusal to obey a summons subjects the affected individ-
ual to civil 13 and possibly criminal 14 consequences.
Willful failure to supply information required by the Internal
Revenue Code is a misdemeanor. ' 5 The refusal must be prompted by
the bad faith or evil intent implicit in the term "willful".' 6 Thus, an
individual who refuses to comply with a summons does not risk crim-
inal prosecution if he believes in good faith that his refusal is legally
justified, even if his position proves to be erroneous.17
Complete disregard of a summons, either by failure to appear or
failure to produce the designated books and records, subjects the
summoned party to criminal prosecution.' 8 In this situation, crimi-
9. But see Rev. Proc. 55-6, 1955-2 CUM. BULL. 904, at 905, which allows the
summons to be "left... in a place where the person summoned will be likely to
find the copy".!!
10. Supra note 8.
11. 28 U.S.C. Rule 45(e).
12. Matter of Rivera, 79 F.Supp. 510, 48-2 U.S. Tax Cas. II 9340 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) where records were located in Puerto Rico.
13. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7402(b) and 7604(a).
14. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203 and 7210.
15. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7203 "Any person . . . required by this title
... to ... supply any information, who willfully fails to . . . supply such informa-
tion.. . shall... be guilty of a misdemeanor...".
16. Accord, Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, at 496-499; 63 S.Ct. 364, at
367-368 (1943).
17. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, at 512; 13 Am. Fed. Tax
R.2d 457, at 459 (1964).
18. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7210 "Any person who, being duly summoned
to appear to testify, or to appear and produce books, accounts, records, memo-
randa, or other papers. . . , neglects to appear or to product such books, accounts,
records, memoranda, or other papers, shall, on conviction thereof be fined . . . or
imprisoned ... or both .... "
(Vol. 2 : p. 261
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nal punishment is prescribed for "neglect" to appear or produce rec-
ords. Here, the word "neglect" connotes something more than mere
inadvertence. To make it a crime to "neglect" implies a willful fail-
ure with knowledge that a reasonable man should have that he was
failing to do what the summons requested. 1 9 A conviction under
either criminal provision is permitted only under regular criminal
proceedings, including trial by jury and proof beyond a reasonab%
doubt.
Sections 7604 (a) and 7402(b) 20 provide that the United States
District Court, for the district in which the person (to whom the
summons is directed) resides or is found, shall have jurisdiction by
appropriate process to compel attendance, testimony, or production
of records. Section 7402 (a) 2 1 grants general jurisdiction to the Dis-
trict Courts in civil actions to enforce the revenue laws by necessary
or appropriate orders and processes.2 2 In the usual case of refusal to
fully comply with a summons, the Internal Revenue Service will insti-
tute proceedings in accordance with section 7604(b).23 A literal
reading of this section provides for the enforcement of any summons
through the issuance of a writ of body attachment, upon proper ap-
plication, by the judge of the district court, or even a United States
commissioner, directed to some proper officer for the arrest of the
person summoned. It is the duty of the judge, or even a United States
commissioner, 2 4 "to hear the application" for an attachment against
the person who had been summoned, and had neglected or refused to
comply, "as for a contempt"; and then, "if satisfactory proof is
made", 2 5 to issue an attachment for the arrest of that person. This
incongruous procedure 2 6 subjects a witness, who may have merely
availed himself of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination
or who felt himself silenced by the seal of a confidential communica-
19. United States v. Becker, 1 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1437 (S.D.N.Y., 1958),
af'd, 259 F.2d 869, 2 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 6041 (2d Cir. 1958); Reisman v. Caplin,
supra note 17 ("noncompliance is not subject to prosecution ... when the sum-
mons is attacked in good faith"); Brief for the Respondent Caplin, pp. 9, 22.
20. Bupra note 13.
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7402(a).
22. Original jurisdiction is granted to the United States District Courts
under any act of Congress providing for internal revenue, 28 U.S.C.A. 1340.
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(b).
24. 28 U.S.C.A. § 631 and 633(3).
25. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9146 (3rd
Cir. 1963).
26. Authorization for enforcement of an administrative summons by body
attachment may not be found in the statutes applicable to other federal agencies,
E.g., 15 U.S.C.A. 78u(c) (S.E.C.); 29 U.S.C.A. 161 (2) (N.L.R.B.); 15 U.S.C.A. 49
(F.T.C.).
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tion, to the opprobrium of an arrest on a warrant issued after an
inadequate ex parte hearing. Based on such a literal interpretation,
the commands of a summons have been enforced by body attachment
before a court determined whether the summons was even valid.2 7
This attachment procedure has occasionally been used where the
person summoned merely refused to testify because of a claimed
privilege. 2 8
Since other enforcement procedures are available, it would seem
preferable for a District Court to issue a rule on the respondent wit-
ness to show cause why he should not obey the summons or be ad-
judged in contempt rather than an order for his forthwith arrest.
Such procedure is authorized by the general language of section
7604 (a) 2 9 which grants the District Court jurisdiction to enforce
compliance "by appropriate process". In this way, the affected indi-
vidual would be given a reasonable period to appear voluntarily at a
full hearing without being subject to the stigmas of an arrest. The
likelihood that the witness will leave the jurisdiction is apparently
not a major risk since a witness is often released on his own recogni-
zance. 3 0 Even where an individual is charged with a Federal crimi-
nal offense, Rule 9 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides that "upon the request of the attorney for the government or
by direction of the court", he may be summoned "to appear before
the court at a stated time and place" instead of being arrested and
brought before the Court.
In 1964, the Supreme Court, after reviewing the legislative history
of Section 7402 (b), stated that the physical attachment of a witness
who has neither defaulted nor contumaciously refused to honor a
summons would raise constitutional considerations. It thus appears
that the attachment provision has been interpreted to apply only to
27. Judge Johnsen, in a concurring opinion in Sale v. United States, 228
F.2d 682, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 794 (8th Cir. 1956) cert. denied 350 U.S. 1006, 76
S.Ct. 650 (1956), severely criticized this procedure. "I should not have supposed
that a Court would lend its sanction to any laying of hands upon an individual's
person and the dragging of him bodily before a magisterial bench, for an admin-
istrative purpose and as an administrative incident, without being able to read,
... language from a statute which expressly spelled out the administrative right
thus to have his liberty imposed upon and to have these indignities inflicted
upon him." This attachment procedure has occasionally been used where the
person summoned refused to testify because of a claimed privilege.
28. Sale v. United States, Id.; Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844, 7 Am.
Fed. Tax R. 8748 (8th Cir. 1929).
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7604(a).
30. E.g., Jarecki v. Whetstone, 192 F.2d 121, 41 Am. Fed. Tax R. 197 (7th
Cir. 1951), Sale v. United States, supra note 27.
(Vol. 2 : p. 261
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persons who are summoned and wholly default or contumaciously
refuse to honor it.31
After the attachment has been served and the person involved
arrested (either actually or constructively), the judge or United
States commissioner must "proceed to a hearing of the case". After
such hearing, the judge and even a United States commissioner (!!)
"shall have the power to make such order as he shall deem proper,
not inconsistent with the law for the punishment of contempts" 'to
compel compliance with the summons and to penalize the person
involved for his default or disobedience.
Thus, the statute3 2 provides for an ex parte preliminary hearing
prior to the issuance of an actual or constructive attachment, fol-
lowed by an advisory hearing prior to the issuance of a final order
directing compliance.
Enforcement petitions are usually supported by the examining
agents' affidavits which set forth the nature and purpose of the ex-
amination, the testimony and/or records involved, and their relevancy
or materiality to the examination. A copy of the summons which had
been issued to and served upon the respondent is generally attached
as an Exhibit, as is a transcript of any hearing before the Internal
Revenue Service which reflects the non-compliance. Whenever a pe-
tition is so implemented, the respondent's answer or other pleading
should be likewise supported by affidavits. Affidavit-fortified petitions
usually pronosticate an effort by the Government to have the matter
disposed of under Rule 43 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(hearing the matter on affidavits presented by the parties). If more
than a skirmish is contemplated, such a hearing is not satisfactory
or recommended; for quoting Mr. Justice Frankfurter's reference to
modern equity practice in Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vil-
lage,3 3 "Modern practice )has tended away from a procedure based on
affidavits and interrogatories, because of its proven insufficiencies".
Indeed, where the pleadings raise any factual issue, the Court of Ap-
peals will reverse the District Court which undertakes thus sum-
marily to decide such issues. 3 4
31. Reisman v. Caplin, aupra note 17.
32. Supra note 23.
33. 333 U.S. 426, at 434 (1948).
34. D.I. Operating Co. v. United States, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5493, at
5496 (9th Cir. 1963) where the issue was whether the items requested "dove-
tailed" with the other records. A district court's reliance on affidavits, to the
exclusion of other evidence, was criticized in Local 174 v. United States, 240 F.2d
387 (9th Cir. 1956) and Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 494
(9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Powell, supra note 25.
19641
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At every stage of the proceeding the "Secretary or his delegate"
has the burden of proving every fact requisite for the statutory re-
lief or assistance sought. "The service has only that power which the
statute confers". 35 The statute commands that "satisfactory proof"
must be made before an attachment may even be issued. At the en-
suing hearing, the "Secretary or his delegate" must offer proof hav-
ing the cogency which makes it "not inconsistent with the law for the
punishment of contempts".
The peregrination of the proceeding may result in the witness being
required to come forward with "confession and avoidance" evidence.
This would be particularly true where an affirmative defense is inter-
posed, such as privilege 36 or the assertion of any Constitutional or
statutory privilege.37 In such a proceeding, the District Court may
punish the person summoned "for his default or disobedience" to the
court's order directing compliance with the summons. Refusal to
obey an administrative summons is not contempt because such sanc-
tion is only appropriate for disobedience of a court order.38
Emphasis on criminal sanctions to enforce the revenue laws has
forced knowledgeable practitioners representing taxpayers who are
the subject of tax fraud investigations to avoid cooperation unlesq
the taxpayer is not only innocent, but has facts to prove it. Often
such taxpayers believe either that antagonizing the agent will auto-
matically convict them, or that the law requires them to comply. It
35. Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, at 187, 3 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d
948 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 360 U.S. 912; Hubner v. Tucker, Id. at 39; Martin
v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R. 699 (9th Cir. 1942).
36. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, at 923, 9 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 366
(2d Cir. 1961).
37. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, at 362-3, 70 S.Ct. 739, at
746 (1950); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, at 88-91, 54 S.Ct. 281, at 284-5
(1934).
38. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, at 488-489,
14 S.Ct. 1125 (1894) ("the question of punishing defendants for contempt could
not arise before the commission; for, in a judicial sense, there is no such thing as
contempt of a subordinate administrative body. No question of contempt could
arise until the issue of law in the circuit court is determined adversely to the
defendants and they refuse to obey, not the order of the commission, but the
final order of the court .. "); Sale v. United States, supra note 27 (concurring
opinion) ("Contempt or contumacy in the nature of contempt . . . does not,
and cannot, . . . legally exist in the administrative or executive branch of govern-
ment-as it inherently does in the judicial field .. "); Application of Howard,
325 F.2d 917, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. I 9147 (3rd Cir. 1963) ((A) person who diso-
beys such an order may be punished for contempt of court. But he is not subject
to this sanction until the court has found the administrative summons lawful and
proper and has ordered him to honor it."); Reisman v. Caplin, supra note 17
("only a refusal to comply with an order of the district judge subjects the witness
to contempt proceedings").
[Vol. 2: p. 261
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must be remembered that the Government must establish beyond a
reasonable doubt both a deficiency and an intent to evade before they
can convict a person of the crime of tax evasion. Non-cooperation is
not accorded to the passive resistant, or the person who is ignorant
of his rights, or one indifferent thereto. Non-cooperation commences
the fight. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat.
REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE
Where the Government seeks to elicit information and an individual
resists, his most powerful weapon is his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The command of the
Fifth Amendment ("nor shall any person . .. be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .") has been inter-
preted to permit the assertion of the privilege in any federal proceed-
ing, including grand jury proceedings 3 9 and Congressional investiga-
tions.4 0 Although this constitutional privilege may, on occasion, save
a guilty man, "it was aimed at a more far-reaching evil - a recur-
rence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their
stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was deemed of more
importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. Having had much
experience with a tendency in human nature to abuse power, the
Founders sought to close the doors against like future abuses by
law-enforcing agencies. ' '4 1
Until 1948, and the landmark decision of Shapiro v. United States,4 2
it was generally agreed that an individual's private records were pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment. That decision incarnated skepticism
as to the quiddity and scope of the Fifth Amendment, and reincar-
nated the "required records doctrine."
Under the so-called "required records doctrine" an unanswered
question remains as to whether an individual taxpayer himself may
be required, despite constitutional privileges, to produce records pre-
scribed by Internal Revenue Code Sec. 6001.4 3 In substance, this doc-
39. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S.Ct. 223 (1950).
40. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 75 S.Ct. 668 (1955).
41. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, at 428, 76 S.Ct. 497, at 501 (1956).
42. 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375 (1948).
43. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6001
NOTICE OR REGULATIONS REQUIRING RECORDS, STATEMENTS, AND SPECIAL RETURNS
Every person liable for any tax imposed by this title, or for the col-
lection thereof, shall keep such records, render such statements, make such re-
turns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary or his
delegate may from time to time prescribe. Whenever in the judgment of the Sec-
retary or his delegate it is necessary, he may require any person, by notice served
19641
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trine, as restated in Shapiro v. United States,4 4 views documents
which are required by statute to be kept for administrative regulation
as "public records" which must be produced.
Shapiro, a licensee under O.P.A. regulations, was summoned by
administrative subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to appear
and produce his sole proprietorship business records. He appeared at
the hearing but claimed the immunity provided under the Emergency
Price Control Act. 4 5 Believing that the presiding administrative
official had granted the statutory immunity, and after expressly re-
serving his constitutional privilege, he produced the subpoenaed rec-
ords. Using information thus obtained, Shapiro was later tried for
violations of the Emergency Price Control Act. His plea in bar, claim-
ing immunity from prosecution under Sec. 202 (g) was denied by the
trial court. Following conviction and appeal, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The Supreme Court interpreted the immunity
proviso to be coterminous with what would otherwise have been one's
constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment, and, since the
records which Shapiro was compelled to produce were records re-
quired to be kept by administrative regulation, "as to which no con-
stitutional privilege against self incrimination attaches," the statu-
tory immunity of Sec. 202(g) did not extend to the production of
these records. 4 6 Thus, in a facile fashion the Court decided that "all
records which Congress may require individuals to keep in the conduct
of their affairs, because they fall within some regulatory power of
Government, become 'public records' and thereby, ipso facto, fall out-
side the protection of the Fifth Amendment that no person 'shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' -4"7
upon such person or by regulations, to make such returns, render such state-
ments, or keep such records, as the Secretary or his delegate deems sufficient to
show whether or not such person is liable for tax under this title.
44. Supra note 42.
45. 56 Stat. 23, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 901 et seq., 50 U.S.C.A.
Appendix, Sec. 901 et seq.; Section 202 (g) stated that "no person shall be excused
from complying with any requirements . . .because of his privilege against self-
incrimination, but the immunity provisions... (from prosecution or penalty on
account of anything concerning which he may testify or produce evidence in
obedience to the agency's subpoena) shall apply with respect to any individual
who specifically claims such privilege."
46. The Supreme Court expressly stated that "... all writings whose keep-
ing as records has not been required by valid statute or regulation... (as well
as) all oral testimony by individuals. continues to be privileged, supra note
42, at 27.
47. Shapiro v. United States, supra note 42, at 37 (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 2 : p. 261
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This decision was based largely on dictum of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Wilson,4 8 wherein the Court declared that the doc-
trine precluding assertion of privilege with respect to public records
".... applies not only to public documents in public offices, but also to
records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable
information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of
governmental regulations and the enforcement of restrictions validly
established. There the privilege, which exists as to private papers,
cannot be maintained." 4 9
An over-zealous extension of the concept would preclude assertion
of a Constitutional privilege with respect to all records which are
required by law to be kept, including those relating to an individual's
liability for income tax. Dicta of various decisions has indicated that
the rule of the Shapiro case applies to the tax records required by the
Internal Revenue Code, section 6001.50 Although the applicability of
the "required-records doctrine" to income tax records has never been
squarely tested, numerous decisions have implied that an individual's
records are immune from compulsory production in a criminal tax
investigation. 5 1 Moreover, the Government seems to have hesitated
48. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538 (1911) (where the
Court held that a corporate officer could be compelled to produce books and rec-
ords belonging to a corporation suspected of fraudulent use of the mails, even
thought the officer might himself be incriminated by their contents).
49. Id at 380; Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, at 590; 66 S.Ct. 1256, at
1260 (1946).
50. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 44 Am. Fed. Tax R. 123 (5th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864, 74 S.Ct. 103 (1953) (after noting that the
Internal Revenue Code requires taxpayers to keep records and that inspection
thereof is authorized, the court decided that the taxpayer, and a fortiori a third
person, could have been required to produce his records (citing Shapiro) and
that such records are not protected by the Fifth Amendment); Beard v. United
States, 222 F.2d 84, 47 Am. Fed. Tax R. 808 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 350 U.S. 62
(1955) (where a taxpayer was convicted in district court on instructions to the
jury that a taxpayer's refusal to produce tax records was a circumstance from
which an inference of guilt could be drawn. In affirming the conviction, the
court of appeals held that there was a ". . . duty imposed by the taxing statutes
upon the defendant to keep records of his transactions so that the extent of his
liability to income tax might be ascertained; and therefore the case falls within
the rule laid down in Shapiro v. U.S. . . . It was held that all records which
Congress in the exercise of its constitutional powers may require individuals to
keep in the conduct of their affairs relating to the public interest became public
records in the sense that they fall outside the constitutional protection of the
Fifth Amendment."); U.S. v. Willis, 145 F.Supp. 365 (D.C.Ga., 1955) (" . . it
matters not whether the special agent . . . is interested primarily in the stamp
tax liability ... or the income tax liability .... The records are 'required records'
and subject to examination.")
51. Landy v. United States, 283 F.2d 303, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9765 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 845, 81 S.Ct. 805 ("The privilege of the Fifth Amend-
1964]
DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
when squarely faced with this question. 5 2 The American Bar Asso-
ciation filed a brief with the Supreme Court in the Beard case 53
wherein the question was directly posed: "Are personal records of
Taxpayer outside the protection of the Fifth Amendment by virtue
of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code ?",54 There, the govern-
ment successfully opposed the granting of certiorari.
It is submitted that the Shapiro opinion does not invite the exten-
sion of the "required-records doctrine" to the records of an individual
mentioned in section 6001 of the Internal Revenue Code. Such over-
extension would mancipate the Fifth Amendment, limiting Constitu-
tional protection only to documents which "the Secretary or his dele-
gate" did not have the foresight or cupidty to require to be kept.
Chief Justice Vinson, writing the decision, himself recognized
.. . that there are limits which the government cannot constitution-
ment must be exercised in connection with precise questions and not as a genera)
excuse for refusing to appear in response to subpoena."); Blumberg v. United
States, 222 F.2d 496, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9437 (5th Cir. 1955) (" . . compulsory
production of a taxpayer's books and records for the purpose of use in a criminal
prosecution would be violative of constitutional protection against self-incrimina-
tion .. "); United States v. Vadner, 119 F.Supp. 330, 45 Am. Fed. Tax R. 717
(E.D.Pa. 1954) ("the defendant's refusal (to produce his books and papers for
inspection) based on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
... was justified .. "); Nicola v. United States, 72 F.2d 780, 4 U.S. Tax Cas.
f1331 (3rd Cir. 1934) ("at ... the trial of the indictment or the hearing before
the District Court to compel testimony, the question of (taxpayer's) constitu-
tional guarantee would have been available as a defense."); Hanson v. United
States, 186 F.2d 61, 51-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9118 (8th Cir. 1950) ("The (cancelled
checks, bank statements and other memoranda) . . . were his private papers and
(taxpayer) might have stood on his constitutional right to decline to produce
them."); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 12 Am. Fed Tax R. 2d 5497 (9th
Cir. 1963) where the taxpayer's attorney invoked the Fifth Amendment for his
client when subpoenaed before a Grand Jury (Note: Grand Jury proceedings are
secret and presumably the taxpayer could be excluded therefrom and thereby
denied the protection of the Fifth Amendment). "If the taxpayer . . . had been
subpoenaed and directed to produce the documents in question, he could have
properly refused. The government would have us hold that the taxpayer walked
into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded with the Amendment's protec-
tion, and walked out with something less."; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, at
633, 6 S.Ct. 524, at 534 (1886) (".. . a compulsory production of the private books
and papers of the owner . . . is compelling him to be a witness against himself
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the constitution .. "); Applica-
tion of House, 144 F.Supp 95, 50 Am. Fed. Tax R. 345 (N. D. Cal. 1956).
52. Matter of Daniels, 140 F.Supp. 322, 56-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9 9451 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) wherein it was noted that the government did not deny that the privilege
against self-incrimination might properly be invoked to protect a taxpayer's
personal records.
53. Beard v. United States, supra note 50.
54. 10 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 55A21, at 76.
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ally exceed in requiring the keeping of records which may be inspected
by an administrative agency and may be used in prosecuting statutory
violations committed by the record-keeper himself." 5 5
True public records, in the sense of publicly owned or governmental
records, fall outside the Fifth Amendment and may be demanded as
instruments of self-crimination. 5 6 True public records were defined
in Evanston v. Gunn5 7 as those ". . . of a public character, kept for
public purposes, and so immediately before the eyes of the community
that inaccuracies, if they should exist, could hardly escape exposure."
The government should be able to seize or examine such records and
the public should have a right to peruse them.
Records do not become public records merely because they are re-
quired to be kept by law. Private records continue to be private rec-
ords. Otherwise, we are all living in glass houses. The phrase ','re-
quired to be kept by law" is no magic phrase which gives Congress,
must less "the Secretary or his delegate," the power to legislate pri-
vate papers in the hands of their owner out of the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. "(T) he compulsory disclosure of a man's private
books and papers, to convict him of crime. .. is contrary to the prin-
ciples of a free government .... It may suit the purposes of despotic
power, but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty
and personal freedom." 5 8
Because an application of the "required records doctrine" to per-
sonal income tax records could substantially nullify the protection
afforded to individuals by the Fifth Amendment, it may be said that
this doctrine, as promulgated in the 5-4 decision of Shapiro, reaches
its breaking point in those situations where a licensee is required to
maintain "quasi-public" records (i.e. - druggist required by statute
to keep records of sales of narcotics or records required to be kept by
other occupations which involve items which may be malum in se) or
the exigency of wartime regulation demands curtailment of individual
rights. The ease or convenience of enforcing statutes based on the
revenue power should not be raised above long-standing rights of an
individual. All constitutional safe-guards are vulnerable to the same
criticism. 5 9 The importance of the Fifth Amendment privilege was
55. Shapiro v. United States, supra note 42, at 32.
56. Davis v. United States, supra note 49, at 594, 602 (dissenting opinion).
57. 99 U.S. 660, at 666.
58. Boyd v. United States, supra note 51, at 632.
59. Shapiro v. United States, supra note 42, at 69 (dissenting opinion)
("While law enforcement officers may find their duties more arduous and crime
detection more difficult as society becomes more complicated, the constitutional
safeguards of the individual were not designed for shortcuts in the administration
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stressed by the Supreme Court in Slochower v. The Board of Higher
Education of the City of New York 60 when it said "the right of an
accused person to refuse to testify .. was so important to our fore-
fathers that they raised it to the dignity of a constitutional enactment,
and it has been recognized as 'one of the most valuable prerogatives
of the citizen.' "
A preclusion of an extension of the "required records doctrine" to
an individual's records prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code safe-
guards the continued existence of the general rule that an individual
may withhold information if there is a reasonable probability that it
might furnish a link in a chain of evidence which could subject him
to any (including non-tax) criminal prosecution.6 1
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination is gen-
erally available only to the individual who may be incriminated by the
disclosure. 62 It is only when a disclosure tends to also incriminate
the third person that he, that third person, can assert his privilege.
Thus, an accountant engaged by the taxpayer may refuse to orally
testify or to produce his own records only if they might incriminate
the accountant.
However, in certain situations, the tax accountant can refuse
to reveal information concerning the taxpayer. The privilege available
where an attorney hires an accountant in connection with the attor-
ney's client's tax fraud case will be examined herein, as well as the
existence and applicability of state statutory accountant-client privi-
leges.
Although there is little authority relating to the application of
privileges in administrative investigations, it is generally assumed
that such inquiries are subject to the same common law testimonial
privileges as judicial proceedings. 63 In cases involving tax investiga-
tions, the courts have either held or assumed that the common law
attorney-client privilege may be asserted during the investigatory
stage.6 4
of criminal justice"); Contra, Benton, Administrative Bupoena Enforcement, 41
TEXAS L. REV. 874 (Oct., 1963) wherein a member of the legal staff of the Federal
Trade Commission, in arguing for speed and efficient use of federal administrative
subpoenas by delegating enforcement of the subpoenas to the agency themselves,
concluded that the courts lacked ". . . competence to control administrative sub-
poena processes .... The knowledge of agencies . . . cannot help but be superior
to that of the district courts. .. "
60. 330 U.S. 551, at 557, 76 S.Ct. 637, at 640 (1956).
61. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2260 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
62. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951).
63. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937).
64. Application of Goodman, 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9269, (D.C. Cal. 1953).
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ACCOUNTANT ENGAGED BY ATTORNEY
Throughout common law history it has been thought essential to ade-
quate legal representation that the attorney obtain from his client a
complete disclosure of all pertinent information within the client's
knowledge. In order to prevent compulsory disclosure of the informa-
tion thus illicited a privileged relationship came to be recognized at
common law between an attorney and his client. This privilege was
necessarily extended to include communications made to the attor-
ney's agents 65 and to the attorney by the client's agents. 66
Such privilege should extend to the situation where a lawyer, in
seeking the information necessary to properly defend his client in
anticipated or pending tax disputes, seeks an expert to assist him in
interpreting and analyzing complicated financial data. 67 The Com-
mittee on Procedure in Fraud Cases of the American Bar Association
has stated that where an attorney hires an accountant in connection
with the attorney's client's tax fraud case, the attorney-client privi-
lege should attach. 68 An extension of the attorney-client privilege to
certified public accountants retained by the attorney for interpretation
and summarization of matters bearing on tax liability of the lawyer's
client is clearly analogous to other situations where the privilege has
been held to include communications made to the attorney's agent.
In 1949, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Himmelfarb
v. United States69 held that the attorney-client privilege does not
extend to accountants employed by lawyers. In Himmelfarb the tax-
payer's attorney engaged an accountant to assist him in preparing a
tax fraud defense. At trial, the accountant was called to identify docu-
65. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2301 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), Agents of an
attorney to which the attorney-client privilege has been held to apply includes
attorney's secretaries and stenographers, (Taylor v. Taylor, 179 Ga. 691, 177
S.E. 582 (1934)); engineers consulted (Lewis v. United Airlines Transport Corp.,
32 F.Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940)); patent experts (Lalance and Grossjean Mfg. Co.,
87 F.563 (C.C.S.D. N.Y., 1898)); physicians (City and County of San Francisco
v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 277, 231 P. 2d 26 (1951)); interpreters to interpret
ancient documents (Churton v. Frewen, 62 Eng.Rep. 669 (1865)).
66. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2317-19 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
67. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2301 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ("it has
never been questioned that the privilege protects communcations to the attorney's
clerks and his other agents (including stenographers) for rendering his services.
The assistance of these agents being indispensible to his work and the communi-
cations of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or
by the client himself, the privilege must include all the persons who act as the
attorney's agents.")
68. A.B.A. COMMITTEE REPORT, SECTION OF TAXATION 112 (1953).
69. Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 49-1 U.S. Tax Cas. g 9319
(9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860, 70 S.Ct. 103.
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ments which he had prepared, including a net worth statement, and to
testify with respect to disclosures made by the defendants, despite an
objection that such testimony was within the attorney-client privilege.
The court held that communications made in the accountant's presence
were not privileged, even though he was the attorney's agent, because
his presence "was not indispensable in the sense that the presence of
an attorney's secretary may be. It was a convenience which, unfor-
tunately for the accused, served to remove the privileged character
of whatever communications were made. (G) ranting that ... volun-
tary extrajudicial disclosures by the attorney are generally inadmis-
sible, we feel that the client impliedly authorized the attorney to make
disclosures to the third person." 70 This court apparently felt that
expertise in accounting matters is not necessary in properly prepar-
ing a client's defense, although secretaries, expert interpreters, physi-
cians, expert engineers, etc. have been clearly held to be within the
area protected by the attorney-client umbrella. An attorney who is
also qualified as a certified public accountant may agree with the court
that the expert assistance of a certified public accountant as an agent
of the attorney, is not "necessary" for an interpretation and analysis
of complicated financial data. However, it is obvious that the great
majority of attorneys recognize that they do not have sufficient depth
when faced with complicated financial analysis. The conclusion of this
decision forces this majority to choose between adequately prepared
representation, jeopardized by potential compulsory disclosure by the
assisting accountant, 7 1 or representation deficient in preparation as
insurance against such compulsory disclosure. It would seem that the
fundamental reason for the existence of the privilege would justify an
extension where the client could not clearly and accurately com-
municate pertinent, though complex or technical, information to the
attorney. Full disclosure necessarily includes a comprehension of al
the information within the client's knowledge. 72 While a legal secre-
tary may be "indispensible" in all situations, an expert agent of the
attorney conceivably could be "more indispensible" for adequate legal
representation in certain situations!
70. The last sentence quoted infers that If the attorney had disclosed matters
received in confidence from his clients to an unauthorized person the disclosure
would be inadmissible, where as if the attorney had implied authority (not
actual authority) to disclose there would be no privilege.
71. Accountants required to testify see, Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d
459 (5th Cir. 1951); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954) (privi-
lege did not apply where the attorney was employed by an accounting firm and
engaged by the client to render accounting services).
72. United States v. Judson, supra note 51. ("The very nature of the tax
laws requires taxpayers to rely on attorneys, and requires attorneys to rely, in
turn, upon documentary Indicla of their client's financial affairs.)
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In 1963 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again reviewed
the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to an accountant en-
gaged by an attorney. In United States v. Judson7 3 the taxpayer,
learning that he was under investigation by the Intelligence Division,
retained attorney Judson to represent him in the pending investiga-
tion. The attorney advised the taxpayer that he needed a net worth
statement in order to adequately represent him. The taxpayer then
retained an accountant who prepared the net worth statement and
turned it over to the attorney for use in rendering the specific pro-
fessional services requested by his client. Subsequently the attor-
ney was served with a subpoena duces tecum 7 4 to produce documents,
including the net worth statement, before the Grand Jury. The at-
torney filed a motion to quash the subpoena which was granted by the
District Court "on the ground that it would be a violation, not only
of the attorney-client privilege in that these are part of the attorney's
workpapers, but also on the further ground that it would be a viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment". On appeal, the court pointed out
that "the net worth statement and the various preliminary memo-
randa which culminated in the net worth statement . . (were) pre-
pared at the attorney's request, in the course of an attorney-client
relationship, for the purpose of advising and defending his clients.
The accountants "role was to facilitate an accurate and complete con-
sultation between the client and the attorney about the . . . (tax-
payer's) financial picture. The lower court was correct in determin-
ing that these documents constituted confidential communications
within the attorney-client privilege". 7 5 Thus, the Ninth Circuit has
reappraised its position as regards a privilege extended to an account-
ant engaged by an attorney and has apparently agreed with the Sec-
ond Circuit's 1961 decision in the case of United States v. Kovel.76
Kovel was employed as a full-time accountant under the direct su-
pervision of the partners of a law firm specializing in tax law. He was
subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury investigating al-
leged tax violations of a client of the law firm. Kovel appeared before
the grand jury but declined to answer certain questions on the ground
of the attorney-client privilege. Subsequently, district court Judge
Cashin directed Kovel to answer the questions, dogmatically stating,
after refusing to review any authority, "You have no privilege as
73. IbId.
74. Authorized by Rule 17(C), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18
U.S.C.A.
75. United States v. Judson, supra note 51, at 461; United States v. Kovel,
supra note 36; City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra note
65.
76. Supra note 36.
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such, 'and' I'm not going to listen". The next day Kovel again refused
to answer the question relating to communications from the client on
the ground that it was privileged communications. Judge Cashin held
Kovel in contempt, sentencing him to a year's imprisonment, immedi-
ate commitment and denial of bail. An appeal from the sentence for
criminal contempt followed. Judge Friendly of the Court of Appeals,
in vacating the judgment and remanding, recognized that ". . . the
complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively
handling clients' affairs without the help of others . . .". The Judge
analogized this case to a situation where a client, who speaks only a
foreign language, is sent by an attorney to an interpreter with in-
structions to interview the client on the attorney's behalf and submit
his summary so that the attorney can give his client proper legal ad-
vice . This analogy is properly extended to accounting concepts which
. . are a foreign language to some lawyers in almost all cases, and
to almost all lawyers in some cases. Hence the presence of an account-
ant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the client, while the client is
relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy the
privilege, any more than would that of the linquist.... What is vital
to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer". Thus, this
case clearly holds that a client's communication to an accountant em-
ployed by an attorney in the course of the attorney's professional
employment is within the attorney-client privilege. Although this de-
cision related specifically to a fulltime employee of the attorney, it is
clear from the opinion, the analogy to the linquist, and the cases cited,
that the privilege would be equally applicable to an independent cer-
tified public accountant engaged to assist an attorney in rendering
professional services within the scope of the attorney's employment
by the client.7 7
Unless an attorney is an authority on all subjects and an expert on
all matters he is certain to be faced with problems which require the
assistance of an expert when developing federal tax fraud defenses.
Take the hypothetical situation of a Chinese immigrant who has con-
tinued to use Chinese characters in maintaining the books of account
of his laundry business. Hardly able to speak English and unable to
communicate his good faith and honesty to the Internal Revenue
Service, he is faced with federal tax charges. When he approaches
your office seeking your assistance in defending him, are you, as de-
fense attorney, required to prepare your case based on the informa-
tion you can glean from his gestures and handsigns only (as insur-
77. It should be noted that there may be no privilege as to information ob-
tained by an accountant independent of an integral client-attorney-accountant
relationship, but see a discussion of this question later in this article.
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ance against compulsory disclosures), or would justice demand that
the attorney employ a confidential agent to assist him in preparing the
defense. Without the aid of a Chinese interpreter to convey the cor-
rect information to the attorney, it would be beyond the lawyer's
capacity to develop his client's case, for Chinese is not a required
course in any law school in this country! Is this Chinaman to be left
nude, without his just defense? It is submitted that information illi-
cited by an interpreter would readily be enclosed within the privilege
and free from compulsory disclosure. The answer would be no differ-
ent if a Chinese accountant would be required to translate the Chi-
nese accountant would be required to translate the Chinese characters
to Arabic financial statements. The answer should be no different if
a certified public accountant assists an attorney in interpreting and
analyzing complicated books and records.
On June 17, 1963 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Reisman
v. Caplin.78 This case appears to be in conflict with United States v.
Kovel.
In Reisman v. Caplin7 9 taxpayer's attorney, deciding that he needed
skilled accounting advice, engaged the accounting firm of Peat, Mar-
wick, Mitchell & Co., to examine and analyze the original books and
records of the attorney's client in connection with the determination
of the liability for federal income taxes of numerous domestic and
foreign corporations, partnerships and individual enterprises in which
the taxpayer was involved. The attorney had hired the accountants
specifically to assist in the preparation for trial of cases pending in
the Tax Court against the taxpayer and to enable the attorney better
to advise the taxpayer in connection with a criminal investigation the
commissioner was threatening to institute. The attorney paid the
accountants for their services. Some of the books were transmitted
to the accountants from the attorney. One year later, while four
civil tax cases were pending in the Tax Court, the Internal Revenue
Service issued summonses to the accountants in three of their offices,
which called for testimony before a special agent concerning the
work performed in the employment of the attorney and the produc-
tion of all books, documents and records, including workpapers and
audit reports, pertaining to the corporations', partnerships' and the
individual's tax liabilities. The attorney sought an injunction to re-
strain the Government from summoning accountants' work sheets
and the taxpayer's books and records, and to restrain the account-
ants, who had advised the attorney that they would produce the re-
78. 374 U.S. 825, 83 S.Ct. 1873 (1963).
79. 8 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5567 (D.C. D.C. 1961), a/i'd on other grounds,
317 F.2d 123, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 675 (C.A.D.C. 1963), afj'd on other grounds,
375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 13 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 457 (1964).
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quested items so as not to risk contempt proceedings.80 In a terse
decision, the court denied the injunction, holding that the taxpayer's
attorney had no standing to sue or restrain the summons to the ac-
countants because the records and work sheets neither fall within
the attorney-client privilege nor the work product of the attorney.
An appeal was affirmed on different grounds. 8 1 On June 17, 1963 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.8 2 Among the questions presented
were: (1) Does the attorney-client privilege extend to accountants'
papers bearing on tax liability of lawyers' clients, and (2) Will en-
forcement of the summons violate a lawyers' right not to reveal their
work-product ?83
The Supreme Court 8 4 deferred answering both of these questions
and rather dismissed the injunction suit for want of equity, conclud-
ing that the petitioning attorney had an adequate remedy at law in a
court proceeding brought by the Commissioner to enforce the sum-
mons. Since enforcement proceedings will now apparently be brought
in three different places (Los Angeles, Chicago and New York), in
three separate enforcement suits on three separate subpoenas, in three
different circuits, the attorney for the taxpayer will be harassed and
economically burdened in any attempt to, in the words of counsel,
"avoid disclosure and unlawful appropriation of their work-product
and trial preparation by their opponent, and to prevent unconstitu-
tional seizure without warrant of confidential and privileged docu-
ments for future use as evidence in criminal proceedings." 8 5 It would
thus appear that the question of the inclusion within'the attorney-
client privilege of a certified public accountant retained to assist an
attorney in the attorney's professional employment is bound to re-
appear in the near future.
In summary, the rule now appears to be that information obtained
by an accountant from the attorney's client, where an integral client-
80. In their answer Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. admitted the essential
allegations in the complaint except the one alleging that they would voluntarily
comply with the subpoenas. As to this they said compliance "would compromise
trial preparation" in the Tax Court cases. They joined the prayer of petitioners
for relief.
81. 317 F.2d 123, 11 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 675 (C.A. D.C. 1963) where the
Court of Appeals reasoned that the suit was against the United States, rather
than the Commissioner, since the summons was within the Commissioner's author-
ity. The United States may invoke its sovereign immunity because it had not
consented to this type of suit.
82. Supra, note 78.
83. 32 U.S.L. WEEK 3027 (U.S. July 2, 1963) (No. 119).
84. Reisman v. Caplin 375 U.S. 440, 84 S.Ct. 508, 13 Am.Fed. Tax R. 2d
457 (1964).
85. U.S. L. WEEK 3217 (U.S. December 17, 1963).
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attorney-accountant relationship exists, would be privileged commu-
nications, with the attorney-client umbrella. But, even where such
integral relationship exists, it is only the oral or written communica-
tions received by the accountant from the client which are privi-
leged. 8 6 Because documents previously in existence do not become
immune merely by placing them in the hands of an attorney or his
agent, the original books and records upon which the accountant's
analysis is based are not within the attorney-client privilege. Infor-
mation obtained from other persons would only be privileged if within
the "work-product rule."8 7
STATUTORY ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Because the accounting profession had not developed to a point where
need for a privilege arose during the formative period of common law
privileges, no common law accountant-client confidential communica-
tion privilege exists.8 8 Therefore, such privilege must arise from
some federal or state statute.8 9 At least fourteen states have enacted
varying forms of statutory privilege for communication between ac-
countants and clients. 9 0 "The C.P.A. Law" of Pennsylvania 91 makes
communications between a client and a certified public accountant
confidential and privileged.
Statutory privileges for confidential communications are created
because the State thinks a particular relationship sufficiently impor-
86. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
87. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385 (1947).
88. Lustman v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d 253, 12 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5463
(3rd Cir. 1963) where the situation arose prior to the enactment of a state
statute.
89. Application of House, supra note 51, at 103.
90. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
91. 1961, Sept. 2, P.L. 1165, 8; 63 P.S. 9.11a
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
Section 11.1. Except by permission of the client or person or firm or corpo-
ration engaging him or the heirs, successors or personal representatives of such
client, or person, or firm or corporation, a certified public accountant or a person
employed by a certified public accountant shall not be required to and shall not
voluntarily disclose or divulge information of which he may have become posses-
sed, relative to and in connection with any professional services as a certified
public accountant, other than the examination of, audit of, or report on any
financial statements, books, records or accounts which he may be engaged to make
or requested by a prospective client to discuss. The information derived from or
as the result of such professional services shall be deemed confidential and
privileged: Provided, however, That nothing herein shall be taken or construed
as modifying, changing of affecting the criminal or bankruptcy laws of this
commonwealth or of the United States.
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tant for its confidentiality to be preserved, even at the cost of losing
evidence which could help in establishing facts in litigation. Recent
over-emphasis of the exclusionary function has deprecated the social
and moral significance of privileged communications. Correctly
emphasizing the moral importance of refraining from coercion of
witnesses in matters of conscience, loyalty and duty would not only
reduce the likelihood of perjury, but would re-establish an individual's
fundamental right to be left alone, in a certain narrowly prescribed
relationship, freed of potential governmental interference.
Two cases regarding the applicability of state-created privileges
in federal tax fraud investigations appear to be in conflict.
In Falsone v. United States9 2 an Internal Revenue agent served a
certified public accountant with a summons to appear before him and
produce his workpapers and other documents relating to the tax lia-
bility of a client whom Falsone represented. The accountant appeared
but refused to testify or produce his workpapers. The United States
then sought and obtained an ex parte District Court order directing
the accountant to obey. A motion to vacate that order and to quash
the summons was filed by the accountant which, after a hearing, was
denied by the District Court. On appeal, Falsone argued that, since
the proceeding was a civil case it should be governed by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure under which privileges of witnesses would
be controlled by Florida statute9 3 making communications between
accountants and clients privileged. The Court of Appeals indicated
that in a civil proceeding to enforce the summons of an Internal
Revenue agent it would apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
but it considered this situation to be merely an administrative "pro-
ceeding," inquisitorial in character, to which the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure would be inapplicable.
In the second case, Baird v. Koerner,9 4 the Court of Appeals applied
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to invoke the state law in deter-
mining the nature and extent of the privilege created by the attorney-
client relationship. Attorney Baird, who had transmitted a substan-
tial payment to the government covering prior years deficiences of
an unidentified client, was summoned to identify the attorney and
accountant who assisted him, and to name his taxpayer client. A
petition was filed in the District Court to enforce the summons and
compel the identity of the client. The attorney refused to answer on
the ground that the names were privileged communications between
92. Supra note 50.
93. FLA. STAT. ANN. 473, 15 (1952).
94. 279 F.2d 623, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 1683 (9th Cir. 1960).
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attorney and client. The District Court found Baird guilty of civil
contempt. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Rule
43 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the California law
relating to attorney-client privilege. The court said, "this is a civil
case ... (I)n civil cases, the strong inference exists that the law of
the forum state has generally been, and should be, applied."
It should be noted that although Baird v. Koerner arose as a pro-
ceeding to enforce an Internal Revenue Code summons, it was from a
citation for civil contempt that the appeal was taken. In Falsone v.
United States the appeal was from a denial of a motion to vacate the
District Court's order to obey the summons. It may be that if Falsone
had persevered and had traced steps comparable to Baird's through
the procedural labyrinth the state statutory privilege would have been
available to him. However, such a distinction based on niceties per-
ceptible only to judges should not pervert ultimate justice.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure control the procedural aspects,
as distinguished from substance, in civil actions in district courts.
Administrative procedure ordinarily has not been governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, such rules do apply in a
proceeding to compel testimony or production of documents before
administrative tribunals in accordance with statute or order. Federal
Rule 81(a) (3) specifically states that
"these rules apply (1) to proceedings to compel the giving of
testimony or production of documents in accordance with a
subpoena issued by an officer or agency of the United States
under any statute of the United States..., and (2) to appeals
in such proceedings."
Since the term "proceeding" is very comprehensive, one should be
able to argue that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to
administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, they have been held not to
apply in the administrative proceeding itself.9 5
In any case, the Federal Rules are and have been held applicable
in proceedings which invoke the jurisdiction of district courts to
compel the production of books, paper or other data for examination
by internal revenue agents. 9 6 This is undoubtedly correct since the
administrative functionary comes into court for its assistance in
95. Falsone v. United States, supra note 50; In Albert Lindley Lee Memorial
Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960, 74 S.Ct. 709;
In re Colton, 201 F.Supp. 13 (D.C.N.Y. 1961), affimed, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962)
("Investigation before special agent of Internal Revenue Service is not a civil
action to which these rules are applicable.").
96. Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., supra note 35.
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obtaining what he failed to get otherwise. By doing this his activity
ceased being an administrative act and became a "lawsuit".9 7
Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regulates the form,
admissibility and scope of evidence in federal civil proceedings. This
rule was intended to provide liberality and flexibility on questions
of evidence in federal proceedings pending the adoption of a detailed
set of evidence rules. Federal Rule 43 (a) provides for the admission
of evidence in federal district courts if it is admissible ". . . under the
statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence hereto-
fore applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of
suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts
of general jurisdiction of the state. . .".98 In summary, this rule
provides for the introduction of evidence if admissible under:
1. Statutes of the United States. 99
2. Federal equity precedents.10 0
3. Rules of evidence applied in the forum state.
If the evidence offered satisfies any one of these three tests, the
rule permits its admission.
Because Federal Rule 43(a) purports to deal with admission of
evidence, rather than its exclusion, difficulty arises only when a state
law would exclude evidence. In such a case, the federal court must
determine whether the evidence is admissible under rules previously
applied in federal courts of equity.
In early years federal courts were compelled, in actions at law, to
follow the statutory rules of the forum state, regardless of whether
rules of evidence were regarded as susbstantive or procedural. 10
However, in equity actions, the federal equity courts apparently
operated without systematic rules of admissibility.' 02 Federal Rule
43(a) was created to achieve consistency between federal law and
equity procedure; however, not to alter substantive rights.' 08
97. Reisman v. Caplln, supra note 84, at 512 ("any enforcement action ...
would be an adversary proceeding affording a Judicial determination of the
challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to witnesses").
98. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a); 28 U.S.C. 43(a).
99. Few Important federal statutes concerning admissibility of evidence
exist (E.g.-Federal Business Record Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 1732 (1958)).
100. There were very few decisions on the admissibility of evidence under
the old equity procedure.
101. Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C. §1652 (1958).
102. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6, at 171 (3rd ed. 1940).
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958).
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Federal Rule 43 (a) requires that federal courts allow the introduc-
tion of evidence that would have been admissible under "the rules
... heretofore applied in the Courts of the United States on the hear-
ing of suits in equity," when such rules favor admission. Because
equity precedents in fact do not exist, Dean Wigmore has interpreted
this rule to mean that the federal courts should strictly conform to
state law and avoid perpetuating a plethora of conflicting federal
judge-made rules.' 0 4 Other commentators also agree that the federal
courts must defer to state privileges, in all cases, diversity and non-
diversity.' 05 Professor Moore states that, with one unrelated excep-
tion, the question of privilege "is controlled principally by state
statutes, which under Rule 43(a) will clearly govern, if no federal
statutes or rules of court contrary to the state statutes are enacted or
promulgated, since the state statutes were followed under the federal
equity practice".' 0 6
Case law involving the effect of state-recognized privilege in federal
courts ranges from recognition of all state privileges' 0 7 to non-
recognition of any privilege.10 8 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has required direct proof of an existing federal equity rule
when choosing as between a state exclusionary rule or the rule of
43(a) requiring admission if any equity rule so provides. 10 9 Some
courts have been inclined to accede to a state exclusionary statute.
In Anderson v. Benson the Court said "(A) state statute, if there is
one, should control though it is more restrictive than federal prece-
dents, but if there is no state statute and the (state) rule is doubtful
as to the particular situation, the more liberal federal precedents may
be followed.l 10
In theory, the federal rules' attempt to achieve procedural uniform-
ity within the various federal courts may not be inconsistent with the
104. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 6C, at 200-01 (3rd ed. 1940); see Lake Shore
National Bank v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 83 F.Supp. 795 (D.Del. 1949), aff'd per
curiam, 178 F.2d 923 (3rd Cir. 1950).
105. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion; Privileges in Fed-
eral Courts Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1956).
106. MOORE'S MANUAL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 20.06(5) (1962).
107. Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
965, 76 S.Ct. 1030; Berdon v. McDuff, 15 F.R.D. 29 (D.C. Mich. 1953).
108. Scourtes v; F. W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (D.C.Ohio 1955).
109. Gordon v. Robinson, 210 F.2d 192 (3rd Cir. 1954); Wright v. Wilson,
154 F.2d 616 (3rd Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 743 (1946).
110. Anderson v. Benson, 117 F.Supp. 765, at 722 (D.Neb. 1953) (privileged
communications); see Baird v. Koerner, supra note 94, at 628 ('... the law of
the forum state has generally been, and should be, applied"); Ex parte Sparrow,
14 F.R.D. 351 (D.C.Ala. 1953).
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post-1938 policy of federal-state conformity in matters of substantive
law. However, differentiating between substantive and procedural
rules and the effect that rules, traditionally regarded as procedural,
may have on a litigant's substantive rights, raises a question as to
whether the federal rules may encroach on the area set aside to state
law. Professor Louisell argues that "... privileged relations are
institutions of the states resulting in substantive rights under state
law which cannot be undermined by federal mandate merely because
the holder of the privilege may be involved in federal litiga-
tion. .. ".I I I
Nevertheless, absent challenge, most courts have regarded eviden-
tiary questions as procedural. For one reason or another, in non-
diversity cases, evidence which would otherwise be privileged under
state law, has generally been admitted under Federal Rule 43 (a) with-
out appreciation of the problems thereby engendered.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO PATENT ATTORNEYS
Frequently in litigation in the federal courts, discovery of papers,
documents and the like in the possession of the opposing client or
his attorney is requested. Just as frequently, discovery of much of
the requested materials is resisted on the grounds that it is privileged.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while permitting liberal
discovery of evidence, recognize privileged material as an exception. 1
What is or is not privileged within the meaning of that term as used
in Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to be deter-
mined by the law of evidence. 2 One of the notable privileges recog-
nized in the law of evidence concerns communications between an
attorney and his client.
Historically, the attorney-client privilege developed in the courts
of England. 3 The privilege originally belonged to the attorney;
111. Supra note 104, at 120.
1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 allows discovery of ". . . any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence .. "
2. Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). At 499 the court stated:
"The word 'privileged' as used in Rule 26(b) relating to depositions and in Rule
34 dealing with discovery and production of documents, etc., should be interpreted
as it is in the law of evidence."
3. 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (hereinafter cited
as Wigmore).
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